Non-human identity (NHI)
Also called NHI, machine identity, workload identity, service identity, service account
A non-human identity (NHI) is an account or credential used by software rather than a person, such as a service account, API key, workload role, bot or certificate, that lets applications, scripts and services authenticate to other systems.
Most identities in a modern estate do not belong to people. Backup jobs, CI/CD pipelines, microservices, monitoring agents, integrations and AI agents all sign in to something, usually with a password, key, token or certificate. These non-human identities often hold broad, long-lived access and have no one watching them, which makes them a frequent target.
What counts as a non-human identity
The OWASP Non-Human Identities Top 10 describes NHIs as the identities software uses instead of people, such as service accounts, API clients and workloads, typically authenticating with API keys, tokens, encryption keys and certificates. Common types include:
| Type | Example | Typical secret |
|---|---|---|
| Service account | Windows service, database application user | Password |
| Workload role | Cloud VM or container role | Short-lived token |
| API client | Integration with a SaaS platform | API key or OAuth client secret |
| Automation | CI/CD pipeline, runbook engine | SSH key, deploy token |
| Device or certificate | mTLS client, IoT device | X.509 certificate |
How it works
An NHI authenticates the same way a person does, but without MFA or a human to notice something odd. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control IA-9 requires services to be uniquely identified and authenticated before communicating, and IA-5(7) forbids unencrypted static authenticators embedded in applications. Good practice is to give each workload its own identity, scope it to least privilege, keep its secrets in a vault or replace them with short-lived credentials, and log what it does.
Why it matters
The 2025 OWASP list names the main risks: improper offboarding, secret leakage, vulnerable third-party NHIs, insecure authentication, overprivileged NHIs, insecure cloud deployment configurations, long-lived secrets, poor environment isolation, NHI reuse, and humans using NHIs. AWS recommends that workloads use temporary credentials through IAM roles, including workloads outside AWS through options such as IAM Roles Anywhere. The OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet recommends dynamic secrets with short leases where possible.
Non-human vs human identities
| Human identity | Non-human identity | |
|---|---|---|
| Sign-in | Interactive, often with MFA | Programmatic, with a secret or token |
| Lifecycle | Joiner, mover, leaver processes | Often created ad hoc, rarely retired |
| Behaviour | Varies by day | Usually regular, so deviations stand out |
Examples
- An application account used by a reporting tool suddenly reads a whole salary table from a new workstation.
- A deploy key committed to a repository years ago still has write access to production.
- An engineer signs in interactively with a service account’s password, hiding who did what.
How SWOT supports it
The Central Vault in SWOT PAM holds SSH keys, cloud keys and API tokens with rotation, and SWOT Cloud PAM issues short-lived cloud credentials instead of long-lived keys. SWOT Radar resolves directory, local and cloud identities and shows which accounts can log in to each host. SWOT DAM scores every database identity, application accounts included, against its own 30-day baseline. FlowForge keeps automation credentials encrypted and records every execution. See DevOps pipelines.
Questions
- Are AI agents non-human identities?
- Yes, when they act with their own credentials. An AI agent that calls APIs, queries databases or runs commands needs an identity and secrets, and it raises the same questions as any other workload: what can it reach, how are its secrets stored and rotated, who owns it, and is its activity recorded and reviewed.
- Who should own a non-human identity?
- Every NHI should have a named human or team owner who is accountable for its purpose, permissions and lifecycle. Ownership makes reviews possible and stops orphaned accounts: OWASP lists improper offboarding as the first risk in its Non-Human Identities Top 10, for identities left active after the service or person behind them has gone.
In SWOT
Sources
Related terms
- Credential vaultingCredential vaulting is the practice of storing privileged passwords, SSH keys, API tokens and other secrets in an encrypted, access-controlled vault that releases or injects them only under policy, rotates them, and logs every use.
- Identity securityIdentity security is the discipline of protecting every human and machine identity, together with its credentials and entitlements, across its lifecycle, so that only verified identities gain the access they need and misuse of that access is detected quickly.
- Least privilegeLeast privilege is the security principle that every user, process and system should hold only the access rights it needs to perform its assigned tasks, and nothing more, so that a mistake or compromise affects as little as possible.
- Zero standing privileges (ZSP)Zero standing privileges (ZSP) is a security model in which no human or machine identity holds privileged rights by default; elevated access is created for a specific task when requested and approved, then removed when the task or time window ends.
- Privileged access management (PAM)Privileged access management (PAM) is the set of controls and tools that decide who may use administrative access to critical systems, for how long and under what conditions, while keeping the credentials protected and every privileged session on record.




