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Free tool · post-quantum readiness

Find the crypto that quantum will break

Find the cryptography that quantum computers will break, and the weak algorithms that are already broken, then map each one to its NIST replacement.

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  • Code files
  • ZIP projects
  • Git repositories
  • API services
  • TLS endpoints

What a finding looks like

A sample file with three problems: one that needs a post-quantum plan, two that are weak already.

  1. # crypto_utils.py (sample)
  2. from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
  3. from Crypto.Cipher import DES
  4. key = RSA.generate(1024)RSA-1024: quantum-vulnerable and too short today → ML-KEM / ML-DSA
  5. cipher = DES.new(key8, DES.MODE_ECB)DES in ECB mode: weak today → AES-GCM
  6. digest = hashlib.sha1(token).hexdigest()SHA-1: retire by 2030 → SHA-256 or SHA-3

Sample file and findings, for illustration.

The migration map

Choose an algorithm to see why it is at risk and what NIST says to move to.

Quantum-vulnerable

RSA

Public-key cryptography based on factoring, which a large quantum computer could break.

Move toML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment; ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for signatures

  • ML-KEMFIPS 203Key encapsulation: the primary standard for general encryption.
  • ML-DSAFIPS 204The primary standard for digital signatures.
  • SLH-DSAFIPS 205A backup signature method, in case ML-DSA proves vulnerable.
  • SHA-2 / SHA-3HashingThe hash families NIST recommends in place of SHA-1.
  • AES-GCMEncryptionAES in an authenticated mode, in place of DES and ECB.

From inventory to migration

  1. 01

    Inventory

    Find where RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, DSA, MD5, SHA-1, DES and AES-ECB are used, in code and in exposed services.

  2. 02

    Prioritise

    Separate what is weak today from what needs a post-quantum migration plan, and rank by exposure and data sensitivity.

  3. 03

    Migrate

    Move key exchange to ML-KEM and signatures to ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, then re-scan to show the risky pattern is gone.

Questions

What is post-quantum cryptography?
Cryptography designed to resist attack by large quantum computers. In August 2024 NIST published the first three standards: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for general encryption and key establishment, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for digital signatures.
Why start before quantum computers exist?
Data encrypted today can be recorded now and decrypted later, and migrating cryptography across many systems takes years. NIST encourages administrators to begin transitioning to the new standards as soon as possible.
Does QuantaxScan also find weak cryptography that is not quantum-related?
Yes. It flags MD5, SHA-1, DES and AES in ECB mode, which are weak today regardless of quantum computing, alongside the quantum-vulnerable RSA, ECDSA, ECDH and DSA.

Sources: NIST: first three finalised post-quantum encryption standards (13 August 2024) · NIST: NIST retires SHA-1 cryptographic algorithm (15 December 2022)

Start your cryptography inventory

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